State of Utah vs. Charles Louis Kinsey: Appellant\u27s Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
State of Utah vs. Charles Louis Kinsey: Appellant's
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul Van Dam; Sandra Sjogren; Utah Attorney General.
Evan R. Hurst; Attorney for Petitioner.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah vs. Charles Louis Kinsey, No. 890296 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1886
.A10 
DOCKET H( 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CHARLES LOUIS KINSEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPELLATE NO. 890296--CA 
DISTRICT CT. NO. 881991476 
Priority Classification No. 2 
AN APPEAL FROM A CRIMINAL CONVICTION AND COMMITTMENT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG PRESIDING 
Paul Van Dam 
Sandra Sjogren 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Evan R. Hurst, 5091 
Attorney for appellant: 
6914 South 3000 East, 202F 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 944-0090 
U U U f i i Oi APHfcMU? 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE 
CIIAI 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Il.ttU I,1111!', 7. 
Defendant Appellant. 
APPELLANT"-' 
APPELLATE •«. 
DISTRICT ::') 
Prioi: 
;. : -, F 
890296--CA 
881991476 
AN APPEAL FROM A CRIMINAL CONVICTION AND COMMITTMENT 
' "I"HI'11 in II II I I i 1 1 ,A II II Il S I 1 ! / 1 1" CCJUPT 
1 )R "THE COUNTY OF SALT I.AF.K, STATU OF UTAH 
THR HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG PRESIDING 
Paul Van Dam 
Sandra Sjogren 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 341 14 
Evan . ii, DU^JI 
Attorney for appellant 
6914 South 3000 East, 202F 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Telephone: (801) 944-0090 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENT:-; 
TABLE ; ! 
JURISDICTIONAI *\TEMENT 
NATURE • ' ' ' 
:.hJ i . SSUES. 
TSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
STATEMENT 14 (!'A," 1K , 
<GUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
2 A cautionary jury instruction is iasufficient 
in trials where eyewitness identification is central 
to the. case, , 
The reasons given by Judge Young did not 
justify the exclusion of expert t?.yewitness 
identification. 
3. The defendant was improperly convicted of 
and sentenced for two offenses which involved one 
act by the perpetrator, , . . , . , , . , , , , . . 
I. The punishment of the theft of merchandise 
valued at $29.98 is so disproportionate as to be 
unconstitutional 
Conclusioi , 
Cert i f ic . . , , 
Addendum., 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
A. CASES 
Solem v. Helm. 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 
77 L.Ed. 2d 637 (1983) 6 
State v. Bishop. 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986) 6,7 
State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) 1,2 
State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) 1 
B. CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES 
United States Constitution, Amendment VIII iii,6 
Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 9 , iii, 6 
Utah Code, Section 76-1-402(1) iv,5 
Utah Code, Section 76-6-412(1) (a) (iii) iv,5 
Utah Code, Section 76-10-504 (1) iv 
-ii-
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) (f) of the Utah Code as an appeal 
from a criminal case in the district court no involving 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appealant was convicted on three criminal counts in the 
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is a cautionary instruction sufficient when eyewitness 
identification is an issue in a criminal case? 
2. Did Judge Young properly exclude expert testimony as to 
eyewitness identification? 
3. Was the defendant improperly convicted and sentenced 
twice for the same act? 
4. Is the punishment of 1 to 15 years proportionate to the 
theft of merchandise valued at less than $30.00? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." United 
States Constitution, Amendment VIII. 
"Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall 
not be imposed: nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor." Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 9. 
"A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action 
for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal 
-iii-
episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a single 
criminal episode shall estciblish offenses which may be punished 
in different ways under different provisions of this code, the 
act shall be punishable under only one such provision; and 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision 
bars a prosecution under any other such provision." Utah Code, 
Section 76-1-402(1). 
"Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter 
shall be punishable as a second degree felony if the actor is 
armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft." Utah Code, 
Section 76-6-412. 
"Any person, except those persons described in Section 76-
10-503 and those persons exempted under Section 76-10-510, 
carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in Part 5, is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor," Utah Code*, Section 76-10-
504(1) subsections excluded. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was on put on trial on the 7th and 8th days of 
March, 1989, before a jury for the charges of Retail Theft, 
Possession of a Concealed Weapon and Aggravated Assault. 
Appellant has steadfastly claimed his innocence, claiming 
mistaken identity. The case against defendant was based on 
eyewitness testimony by two security officers for Sears, Officer 
Dial, whose testimony goes from page 3 to 69 of the trial 
transcript, and Officer Maddox, whose testimony goes from page 70 
to page 96 of the transcript, and a videotape of the perpetrator, 
introduced into evidence on page 67 of the trial transcript. 
-iv-
Defendant sought to have Edward Barton testify as an expert 
witness as to eyewitness identification, and a proffer of 
evidence was made, pages 116 to 136 of the transcript. Judge 
Young granted the prosecutions motion to exclude the evidence by 
Mr. Barton. Page 143 to 145 of the transcript. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Problems of unreliability of eyewitness testimony require 
the admissability of expert witness testimony to assist the jury 
in understanding scientific problems with that type of evidence. 
Judge Young improperly excluded expert witness testimony in 
that no adequate safeguards existed to protect defendant risks of 
unreliable evidence. 
Defendant was convicted twice for the same act. 
Treatment of retail theft of an amount less than $30.00 is 
disproportionate to the point of unconstitutionality. 
-v-
ARGUMENT 
1. A cautionary jury instruction is insufficient in trials 
where eyewitness identification is central to the case. 
In recent years, there has been a growing acknowledgment 
that eyewitness identification is not as reliable as once 
thought. The Utah Supreme Court took notice of the fact that 
eyewitness identification is unreliable on the basis of the 
general acceptance of that view by the scientific community. 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d 388 (Utah 1989). Although the Court 
did approve a cautionary jury instruction in State v. Long, 721 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), that step did not go far enough to counter 
public misperceptions as to eyewitness identification. 
In discussing problems with misperceptions as to eyewitness 
identification, the Court in Long stated, 
Although research has convincingly demonstrated 
the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, 
jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these 
problems. People simply do not understand the 
deleterious effects that certain variables can have on 
the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest 
eyewitness. (citations omitted) Moreover, the common 
knowledge that people do possess often runs contrary to 
documented research findings, (citation omitted) Long 
at 490. 
The question then arises as to whether the cautionary 
instruction, which lists criteria for the jury to consider in 
evaluating eyewitness identification testimony, is sufficient. 
If the common knowledge that people possess often runs counter to 
scientific findings, how is the jury assisted by merely listing 
variables to consider? Without guidance as to the effects of the 
several variables on eyewitness identification, isn't the jury no 
1 
better off than before? 
The Long court stated that, "at a minimum, additional 
judicial guidance to the jury in evaluating such testimony is 
warranted." Loner at 492. The issue of expert witness testimony 
as to the flaws and limits of eyewitness identification testimony 
was not before the court in Long so the guestion as to whether 
the minimum standard could extend in some cases beyond a mere 
cautionary instruction was never reached. 
Another concern mentioned in the Long decision is the 
concern of some courts that a cautionary instruction would amount 
to improper judicial comment on the evidence. Long at 492. The 
Court dispensed with that argument by stating that it could be 
avoided by a careful drafting of the instruction. An easier 
solution would be to allow expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification. The adversarial system that is the hallmark of 
our legal system would provide the jury, through effective cross-
examination, with a clearer view as to the capabilities and 
limitations on eyewitness identification. 
2. The reasons given by Judge Young did not justify the 
exclusion of expert eyewitness identification. 
The defendant was arrested and charged in this case on the 
basis of an eyewitness identification that took place nine and 
one half months after the crime. The only other evidence to link 
the defendant to the crime was the in court identification by the 
other officer and a videotape. The identification by Officer 
Maddox is suspect in that no lineup or other procedure was 
2 
utilized. Officer Dial, the arresting officer, testified that 
he viewed the videotape between 30 and 50 times,, Page 36 of the 
trial transcript. The problem is that after viewing the tape so 
many times, it is possible that the identification of the 
defendant could possibly have resulted from his similarities to 
the suspect on the video and not from any recollections by 
Officer Dial. 
Judge Young excluded the expert witness on the basis that 
the eyewitness identification was aided by the videotape, the 
jury could draw their own conclusions from the videotape and that 
there were safeguards that already protected the defendant from 
an improper identification. Pages 143 and 144 of the trial 
transcript. But, whether the jury can make their own 
determination through the videotape does not affect the 
reliability of eyewitness testimony and is more of an argument as 
to why the eyewitness testimony is not needed. The quality of 
the videotape becomes an essential part of this case at this 
time. The expert witness, Edward Barton, testified in the 
proffer of evidence that a videotape could re-enforce eyewitness 
observations if the quality of the video or photograph was such 
to clearly identify the person. Page 135 of the trial 
transcript. The important factor is the quality of the video. 
Judge Young evidently relied on this to exclude the testimony 
without making a determination as to the quality of the 
videotape. While the subject does bear considerable resemblance 
to the defendant, the videotape is not so clear as to be 
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determinative as to identity. The nature of the black and white 
picture and the distance of the subject from the cameras makes a 
certain identification from the tape impossible. The existence 
of the tape is certainly an aid as to identification, but the 
effect of the tape on the eyewitness identification is certainly 
open to interpretation. The tape, according to its quality, 
either aids or prejudices the eyewitness identification. 
The safeguards mentioned by Judge Young do not provide any 
additional protection to defendant than in the usual instance and 
are equally adaptable to exclude any evidence offered by a 
criminal defendant. 
First, the notion that a defendant is protected by 
discretion on the part of a prosecutor is flawed in that it plays 
into the argument that an accused is guilty or he would not be on 
trial. The second notion that the defendant is protected by 
judicial suppression in the event of unreliability allows for 
absolute judicial determination of reliability if the defense is 
not allowed to bring out all issues that reflect on reliability. 
There should be a recognition of a sliding scale of reliability. 
Absolutely unreliable testimony should be excluded, but all 
issues that reflect on the reliability should be admissible. A 
threshold test of reliability should not render testimony 
unimpeachable. The third safeguard of effective cross-
examination and persuasive argument is good protection, but 
counsel is prohibited from becoming a witness as to the various 
problems with eyewitness identification. The fourth safeguard of 
4 
the cautionary instruction has the problems stated above, i.e. 
insufficient instruction as to the interpretation of the 
variables. As to the fifth safeguard of the need for unanimity 
for a jury verdict, a jury cannot be expected to sort out 
unreliable evidence without some assistance. The Long case 
certainly points out the common misperceptions as to eyewitness 
identification. A jury tainted by misperception offers no 
protection merely on the basis of the unanimity requirement. 
As to the last safegucird, judicial relief from a conviction 
applies only clear cut cases. The case at hand is a very close 
case. There is quite a bit of resemblance between the defendant 
and what you can make of the subject on the tape. In cases such 
as this, the need for assistance in interpreting the reliability 
of the evidence and testimony is all the more important. 
3. The defendant was improperly convicted of and sentenced for 
two offenses which involved one act by the perpetrator. 
Defendant was convicted and sentenced for both Retail Theft 
and Carrying a Concealed Weapon. The Retail Theft conviction was 
a Second Degree Felony pursuant to Section 76-6-412(1)(a)(iii) of 
the Utah Code because of the possession of deadly weapon by the 
perpetrator at the time of the theft. Otherwise the offense is 
a Class B Misdemeanor because the value of the stolen merchandise 
was only $29.98. 
Section 76-1-402(1) of the Utah Code provides in part that 
"when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be punished in different ways 
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under different provisions of this Code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision." The possession of a 
weapon by the perpetrator is punishable as an enhancement to the 
theft or as a concealed weapon. For reasons of proportionality 
set forth hereafter, the act should be punished as a concealed 
weapon with the theft being reduced to a Class B Misdemeanor. 
4. The punishment of the theft of merchandise valued at $29.98 
is so disproportionate as to be unconstitutional. 
Both the United States Constitution and Utah Constitution 
prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. United States 
Constitution, Eighth Amendment and Utah Const. Art. 1 Section 9. 
Encompassed within the concept of cruel and unusual punishment is 
the concept of proportionality of the offense to punishment. 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed. 2d 637 
(1983) and State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986). Factors to 
consider in determining proportionality of an offense to the 
punishment include the gravity of the offense and the harshness 
of the penalty. Bishop at 269. In general, it is accepted that 
murder is more serious than other crimes and that crimes against 
persons are more serious than crimes against property, and that 
crimes of violence are more culpable than those that do not 
involve violence. Bishop at 269. 
In this case, the defendant was sentenced to 0 to 6 months 
for the concealed weapon, to 0 to 5 years for pointing a weapon 
at two persons, and to 1 to 15 years for stealing $29.98 worth of 
merchandise. Pages 154 to 156 of the District Court record. 
6 
Clearly, according to the criteria from Bishop, punishment of the 
retail theft in this case is disproportionate. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the need for expert testimony to assist the jury 
in interpreting eyewitness identification occurring nine and one 
half months after an incident and the lack of adequate safeguards 
to protect the defendant, the conviction should be set aside. In 
the event that the Court will not set the conviction aside, the 
conviction of retail theft should be changed to a Class B 
Misdemeanor in the interests of proportionality. 
Dated this 18th day of December, 1989. 
Evan Hurst / 
Certificate of mailing 
I certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing brief, 
postage prepaid, first-class mail this 18th day of December, 
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Paul Van Dam 
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Utah Attorney General 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Evan R. H 
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IT APPEARS 
THIS 
THIS 
CASE 
CASE 
JUDGE YOUNG: I WILL TELL YOU, GENTLEMEN, THAT 
TO ME THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, 
IS DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE CHAPPEL CASE WHEREIN 
INVOLVES THE POTENTIAL FOR THE JURY TO 
CONCLUSIONS BASED UPON THEIR OWN OBSERVATIONS OF 
TAPE 
THAT 
THE 1 
WHICH 
WOULD 
SEEMS TO ME TO GIVE THEM A COMPARATIVE 
NOT OTHERWISE Bb AVAILABLE. THAT ALSO 
DFFICERS WHO HAVE IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT A 
REFERENCE 
THE 1 
IF THEY PRESUME THAT THE VIDEOTAPE IS, 
DEFENDANT. THUS, THE CAUTION THAT MR. BARTON 
PROVIDE TO THE JURY THE COURT DOES NOT FIND WOULD 
DRAW 
THE VIDEO-
REFERENCE 
PROVIDES 
REFRESHER 
IN FACT, 
MIGHT 
BE BENE-
FICIAL AND IN EXCESS OF THAT WHICH WOULD ALREADY BE PROVIDED 
BY WHAT, AS I RECALL, WAS INSTRUCTION NO. 14 PROVIDED BY 
THE STATE, PROPOSED BY THE STATE, AND, IN FACT, ADOPTED 
BY THE DEFENDANT AND REQUESTED TO BE GIVEN. THE COURT WILL 
GIVE THAT INSTRUCTION. IT IS ABOUT A THREE OR FOUR PAGE 
INSTRUCTION ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. I THINK IT 
PROVIDES SUFFICIENT CAUTION 10 THE JURY. 
I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE SAFEGUARDS THAT HAVE 
BEEN STATED IN THE CASE OF STATE V. HELTER BRIDLE FROM 
MINNESOTA ON PAGE 547 OF THAT DECISION WOULD HELP THE DEFEN-
DANT TO BE SAFEGUARDED AGAINST AN IMPROPER IDENTIFICATION. 
THOSE ARE LISTED AS FOLLOWS. FIRST, THE PROSECUTORS DO 
NOT NEED TO PROSECUTE IF THEY THINK THE EVIDENCE IS 
UNRELIABLE. IN THIS CASE THAT DECISION HAS PREVIOUSLY BEhN 
lm 
1 MADE. 
2 SECOND, THE TRIAL COURT MAY SUPPRESS IDfcNTIFI-
3 CATION TESTIMONY IF THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES RENDERED 
4 THE EVIDENCE UNRELIABLE. THERE IS NONE OF THAT IN THIS 
5 CASE. 
6 THIRD, EFFECTIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION AND PURSUASIVE 
1 ARGUMENT BY DEFENSE COUNSbL ARE ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS THAT'S 
8 BEEN ADEQUATE AND CAREFUL AND COMPETENT CROSS-EXAMINATION 
9 OF, PARTICULARLY, OFFICERS DIAL AND MADDOX. 
10 FOURTH, PROPER INSTRUCTION OF THE JURY--AND THAT, 
11 I THINK, WILL BE INCLUDED IN OUR INSTRUCTION NOW NUMBERED 
12 14, MAY NOT BE NUMBERED THAT IN THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN. 
13 FIFTH, THE REQUIREMENT OF THE UNANIMITY OF THE 
14 JURY IS AN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARD TO THE DEFENDANT. 
15 FINALLY, THE COURT HAS THE POWER TO GRANT RELIEF 
1« IF IT IS CONVINCED THAT THE EVIDENCE, IF CONVICTED--EVIDENCE 
17 OF A CONVICTED DEFENDANT'S GUILT WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT. 
18 BASED UPON THOSE SAFEGUARDS THAT I THINK ARE 
19 IDENTIFIABLE IN THIS CASE THE COURT RULES IN FAVOR OF THE 
2 0
 STATE—/S IT YOUR MOT/ON, A MOTION IN LIMINE TO SUPPRESS 
2
* I THE RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY? 
MR. YBARRA: IT IS, YOUR HONOR. 22 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: COURT GRANTS THE STATE'S MOTION 
24 IN LIMINE AND DENIES THE REQUEST OF THE DEFENSE TO HAVE 
2 5
 MR. BARTON TESTIFY ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. I BELIEVE 
144 
THE JURY HAS SUFFICIhNT INFORMATION TO MAKh AN APPROPRIATh 
DECISION. ALL RIGHT. 
Wfc WILL Bh IN BRIhF RhCbSS UNTIL Wh CALL THE 
JURY IN. 
(RECESS). 
•I 
JJ»S. 
